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Abstract:  In  applications  of  wireless  sensor  networks,  there  are  many  security  issues. 
Attackers can create false reports and transmit the reports to the networks. These false 
reports can lead not only false alarms, but also the depletion of limited energy resources. In 
order to filter out such false reports during the forwarding process, Ye et al. proposed the 
statistical en-route filtering (SEF). Several research efforts to enhance the efficiency of 
SEF have been made. Especially, the path selection method proposed by Sun et al. can 
improve the detection power of SEF by considering the information on the filtering keys of 
and distances of upstream paths. However, such selection mechanism could lead to favored 
paths in heavy traffic, which would result in unbalanced energy consumption. In this paper, 
we propose a path renewal method to provide load balancing for sensor networks in terms 
of energy consumption. In our method, a node renews its upstream path to save energy 
resources if the remaining energy of and the communication traffic of the node exceed 
some threshold values. We show the effectiveness of the proposed method in terms of 
balanced energy consumption and filtering power by providing simulation results. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent  advances  in  wireless  communications  and  electronics  have  enabled  the  development  of  
low-cost, low-power and multi-functional sensors that are small in size and communicate over short 
distances [1]. A wireless sensor network (WSN) is composed of a large number of small sensors with 
constrained  energy,  limited  computation,  communication  range,  and  unchangeable  battery  power. 
Sensor nodes can be distributed in an outdoor environment to collect sensing data and forward it to 
base station via wireless channel [2-4]. Applications of WSNs range from indoor applications such as 
smart  homes  and  health  monitoring  in  a  hospital  to  outdoor  applications  such  as  highway  traffic 
monitoring, combat field surveillance, security and disaster management [5-8]. 
In  many  applications,  WSNs  are  deployed  in  outdoor  environments.  Consequently,  they  are 
vulnerable to false data injection attacks [9] in which an adversary inject false sensing reports into the 
network, through compromised nodes, with the goal of deceiving the base station or draining the 
constrained energy of the nodes [10]. The statistical en-route filtering scheme (SEF) [9] can filter out 
forged  reports  during  the  forwarding  process.  In  the  scheme,  for  an  event,  sensing  nodes 
collaboratively generate a report which contains message authentication codes (MACs) so that each 
MAC  is  generated  from  a  node  using  its  symmetric  keys  and  represents  its  agreement  on  the  
report [11]. As a report is forwarded towards the base station over multiple hops, each forwarding node 
verifies the MACs carried in the report, checking if it has any of the keys used to generate those 
MACs. If it does not have any of those keys, the report is forwarded without verification. Therefore, 
the detection power of the SEF is affected considerably by the choice of routing path [12]. 
The path selection method (PSM) [12] was proposed to improve the detection power of SEF. In 
PSM sensor nodes evaluate the detection power of each incoming path from the base station and elect 
the most secure path for data transmission against false data injection attacks. In order to evaluate the 
path,  each  sensor  node  inserts  additional  information  about  filtering  keys  into  a  control  message. 
However, such path selection based on the security power would make the most secure paths undergo 
heavy traffic so that the nodes along the paths would consume more energy resources. That is, the 
limited energy resources of the network would be spent in an unbalanced fashion, which could cause 
the decrease of the overall network lifetime. 
In this paper, we propose a path renewal method (PRM) to prolong a network lifetime. While the 
energy consumption of each sensor node is basically proportional to data transmissions, events do not 
uniformly occur on a sensor field. Thus, we cannot predict the energy consumption patterns in the 
network. In the paper, we represent a WSN as a digraph (directed graph), and define a communication 
traffic model. Based on the model, we propose a fitness function for the renewal of routing paths. To 
show the effectiveness, we have compared the proposed method with the two existing methods, SEF 
and PSM, in terms of balanced energy consumption and reliability of data transmission by providing 
simulation results. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly explains the related works and 
the motivations of this work. Sections 3, 4, and 5 present a network model, the proposed path renewal 
method,  and  an  evaluation  function,  respectively.  Section  6  gives  simulation  results.  Finally, 
conclusions and future works are covered in Section 7. 
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2. Related Works and Motivations 
In  this  section,  we  review  the  two  existing  methods—SEF  and  PSM—and  then  explain  the 
motivations of this paper. 
2.1. Statistical En-routed Filtering Scheme (SEF) 
SEF was the first scheme to address false data injection attacks in the presence of compromised 
nodes and it focuses on the detection of false event reports, which are known as false positive attacks, 
injected by compromised nodes. In SEF, the base station maintains a global key pool, which is divided 
into  multiple  partitions  and  every  node  loads  a  small  number  of  keys  from  a  randomly  selected 
partition in the global key pool before it is deployed. 
When real events occur, one of the detecting nodes is elected as the center-of-stimulus (CoS) node 
to generate a sensing report. The surrounding nodes, which detect the same event, produce MACs for 
the event, using their stored keys, and send them to the CoS which generates a sensing report using the 
collected MACs. This set of multiple MACs acts as the proof that a report is legitimate [9] after which 
points the CoS forwards the report toward the base station (BS) over multi hops. Each forwarding node 
verifies the correctness of the MACs carried in the report by using its keys. When the BS receives a 
report, it can verify all the MACs carried in the report because it has complete knowledge of the global 
key pool [9]. 
2.2. Path Selection Method (PSM) 
In SEF, the detection power of false reports is affected considerably by the choice of the routing 
paths. In the worst case, forwarding nodes may not have any of the keys used in report generation so 
these forwarding nodes cannot verify any false reports.  
In [12], authors proposed a path selection method (PSM) in order to improve the filtering power for 
false positive attacks. In PSM, routing paths are established by flooding with a control message [13,14] 
and can be selected with the consideration of the security level and the transmission distance. The 
control message contains information about the partition IDs of visited nodes and hop count. This 
information is used to evaluate the quality of the path. 
2.3. Motivations 
In PSM, after routing paths are established in the initial phase, each sensor node only sends data to 
designated sensor node (e.g., the most downstream nodes along the chosen path). Let a transmitting 
node be a sub-node and a receiving node be a super-node. In a PSM-based network, a single sub-node 
can be assigned to only one super-node or a single super-node can have multiple one sensor nodes (if it 
is on a ‘promising’ path). Thus, the super-node that has many sub-nodes will consume more energy 
than other super-nodes that have small number of sub-nodes. Therefore, the network lifetime will 
decrease due to such unbalanced energy consumption. 
In this paper, we propose a path renewal method (PRM). After the routing paths are established, 
each super-node checks its remaining energy. If the remaining energy of its super-node is less than a 
pre-defined threshold value, one of super-node’s children (i.e., sub-nodes) changes the routing path Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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using PRM. That is, the sub-node chooses a new super-node. The super-node manages the list of its 
sub-nodes. The super-node sends an eviction message to the sup-node. The super-node selects the  
sub-node by considering the sub-node’s communication traffic. The detailed description is presented in 
section 4 and our network model is described in the next section. 
3. Network Model 
A wireless sensor network is composed of a base station and large number of sensor nodes. The 
network can be represented as a digraph (or directed graph) G. The graph G is defined as follows: 
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In Equation (1), V is a set of vertices and each vertex denotes a sensor node. E is a set of edges and 
each edge denotes a link between vertices (i.e., sensor nodes). For two arbitrary integers i and j, where 
i and j are less than n, eij (E) indicates a communication link between vertex vi and vj (vi,vj  E). An 
in-degree (and out-degree) is the number of inward (and outward) graph edges from a given graph 
vertex in the directed graph. Figure 1 shows the in-degree and out-degree. 
Figure 1. In-degree and out-degree. 
 
In the figure, the in-degree and out-degree of v0 are 3 and 1, respectively. We denote that v0 is the 
super-node  for  nodes  v1,  v2  and  v3.  Also,  nodes  v1,  v2  and  v3  are  sub-nodes  of  v0,  respectively. 
Additionally, the number of the in-degree can be represented as an amount of communications.  
In this paper, we propose a path renewal method to uniformly consume energy resources. In our 
proposal, each sensor node can know the amount of communications and remaining energy. In the 
figure, if the remaining energy of v0 is less than a threshold value, one of the sub-nodes searches a new 
super-node. Our proposal is briefly illustrated in the next section. 
4. Path Renewal Method 
In our network model, routing paths are established by the flooding of a control message. This 
fashion is commonly used in most routing protocols at the initial establishment of routing path. Similar 
to PSM, a control message includes information on the partition of the keys (PIK) and on hop counts 
from the base station (HC). Also, each node can know its own in-degree. Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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Figure 2 shows a propagation of a flooding message. In the figure, the node that received the 
message inserts its PIK to the message and forwards it to the next hop (toward terminals). Suppose N2 
receives the control message including PIK of 1 and 7 from N1. When N2 sends the message to the next 
node, it inserts its PIK to the message. Here, given N1, N1.PIK(5) implies that N1 stores PIK that is 5. N3 
does not need to insert the PIK to the message since PIK in the message already has PIK(7). 
Figure 2. Flooding control message. 
 
After the paths are established, all nodes store their in-degree and the list of the sub-nodes by 
elapsed time. Each node manages the list. The list is comprised of IDs of sub-nodes and the number of 
data transmissions of each sub-node. For an arbitrary super-node Nsup and three sub-nodes Nsub.1, Nsub.2 
and Nsub.3, the process of path renewal is as follows: 
Table 1. Migration of super-node. 
 
In  the  table,  TE,  EM,  and  FM  are  threshold  energy,  eviction  message,  and  fare  message, 
respectively. Let Nsub.3 have the highest number of the transmissions in the list. If the remaining energy 
of Nsup is less than TE, Nsup sends EM to Nsub.3. EM includes the fitness value of Nsup. Nsub.3 finds a new 
super-node in the neighboring nodes. Each of the neighboring nodes sends its own fitness value to 
Nsub.3. If Nsub.3 finds a new super-node that has the highest fitness value, Nsub.3 sends FM to Nsup and 
migrates to other super-node. After Nsup receives the RM from Nsub.3, Nsup removes Nsub.3 in the list. 
 
SuperNode Nsup; 
SubNode Nsub.1, Nsub.2, Nsub.3; 
 
IF Nsup.energy < TE THEN 
Nsup sends EM to Nsub.3; 
 
Nsub.3 finds neighbor nodes; 
 
IF neighbor nodes is NOT NULL AND 
fitness(neighbor nodes) > fitness(Nsup) THEN 
Send FM to Nsup; 
Nusb.3 migrates to new SuperNode; Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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5. Evaluation Function 
To  elect  a  new  super-node,  we  define  an  evaluation  function  by  considering  HC,  ID,  EC  and 
diversity of PIK. The evaluation function is defined as follows: 
      F n EC n DPIK n    
    (2)  
In Equation (2), the evaluation function consists of EC and DPIK. EC is energy consumption and 
DPIK is a diversity of PIK. Alpha is a security weight factor determined by the user. So, for an 
arbitrary sensor node n, EC and DPIK are defined as follows: 
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In Equation (3), nHC, nID and nRE are a hop count, in-degree and remaining energy of the node n 
respectively. It is clear that energy consumption is affected by hop count and in-degree. So, we can 
represent energy consumption of the node with consideration of nHC and nID. DPIK implies a diversity 
of partition information of key. In the equation, DPIK is a number of elements of PIK. 
6. Simulation Results 
A simulation was performed to compare the proposed PRM method with the existing SEF and PSM 
ones. A performance criterion is balanced energy consumption and success rate of data transmission. 
We also analyze the detection power of proposed method. In the simulation, the network consists  
of 1,000 nodes spread over a territory whose size is 100 × 120 m. The nodes are randomly deployed in 
the  territory  and  the  base  station  is  placed  at  the  end  of  the  territory.  Each  sensor  node  
takes 16.56 μJ/12.5 μJ to transmit/receive a byte, and each MAC generation consumes 15 µ J. The size 
of original report and of MAC is 24 and 1 bytes, respectively. There are 1,000 keys in the key pool, 
which is divided into 10 partitions.  
Figure 3 shows a filtering rate for false reports with a security weight in case that the number of 
forged MACs per a report is 1, 4, 10 and 16. For the same network topology, routing paths on SEF, 
PSM and PRM are established, respectively. Then we generate false reports in the network. Assigned 
keys in each node are randomly generated with various seed values from 0 to 9. We calculate an 
average dropping rate for the false report. 
In the figure, the proposed method is better than SEF but less efficient than PSM in terms of 
dropping ratio. The figure illustrates a similar performance for PRM and PSM. In PSM, each node 
chooses a super-node by considering information of keys on incoming path from the base station. In 
PRM, each node only has partition information of nodes within five hop counts, so the performance of 
the proposed method is a little less efficient than PSM. Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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Figure 3. Ratio of filtered false reports with the security value (α). 
 
 
 
Figure 4 shows an average number of traveled nodes to filter the false report. The reports are 
generated with 1, 4, 10, 16 forged MACs. The number of traveled nodes in the original SEF approach 
is the highest since routing paths are chosen with consideration of only hop counts. Though PSM 
detects the false reports earlier than PRM, the performance gap is acceptable. 
Figure 4. Average number of traveled nodes for filtering false reports with the security value (α). 
 
 
Figure 5 shows the number of alive node that can send a data to next node or base station in SEF, 
PSM and PRM. We generate false reports that include eight forged MACs and inject the report into  
the network.  Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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Figure 5. Number of alive node by elapsed time with the security value (α) in case that the 
number of forged MAC is 8. 
 
When the routing paths are established, each node considers hop counts or hop counts and partition 
information of keys. Therefore, the path would make the most secure paths in heavy traffic so that the 
nodes along the paths would consume  more energy resources. Also, the super-node that has high  
in-degree (i.e., many sub-nodes) would consume more energy resources. That is, the communication 
traffic of the super-node is more than others that have a low in-degree and the node should be consumes 
much energy than others. In other hand, PRM considers communication traffic when a sub-node selects a 
super-node. For these reasons, the network life time of PRM is better than that of either SEF and PSM. 
7. Conclusion and Future Work 
There are many security issues including false data injection attacks in WSNs. SEF [9] is the first 
solution that can alleviate the impacts of the attacks. While a sensing report is being forwarded toward 
the base station, the report is verified by the forwarding nodes. PSM [12] can enhance the detection 
power of SEF. Every control message stores the information on the filtering keys of the nodes it 
traveled on, when paths are established by flooding. A sensor node has an evaluation function to 
choose the most secure path based on the information.  
In this paper, we proposed a path renewal method to provide WSNs with load balancing. A network 
is represented as a digraph and a communication traffic model for the network is proposed. Base on the 
model, an evaluation function to choose a new super-node is defined. The effectiveness of the propose 
method is shown with the simulation results. As future works, some AI algorithms will be applied in 
order to find further optimal solutions. 
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